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RAPE BY MALICE
Kari Hong*
I. INTRODUCTION
When people seek to reform rape law, the focus is on changing the actus
reus—either abandoning the force element or redefining consent. This article
argues that both approaches overlook a critical opportunity for reform, which
is the crime’s mens rea. Knowledge, or general intent, is the most common
mens rea in rape offenses. The problem with this mental state is that proving
what a defendant knew is one of the hardest parts of any criminal prosecu-
tion. Although scholars have explored reckless or negligent standards, this
article proposes that states adopt the mens rea of malice—a callous indiffer-
ence towards the risk of whether the defendant had secured the consent of his
sexual partner. If someone shoots a gun in a crowd and kills someone, that
person had no knowledge or intent to kill. But the shooter would be liable for
murder under the mens rea of malice because the person acted with callous
disregard to the objective risk of harm that her conduct involved. When im-
ported to rape, malice effectively captures what is the precise social wrong in
having unwanted sex—it is a defendant acting with callous indifference to
whether his or her actions present an objective risk that he or she is engaging
in sexual activity without the consent of his or her partner.
When discussing contemporary rape, a couple statistics stand out: ap-
proximately 80% of all rapes are committed by people known to the vic-
tim1; and only 3% of all rapes result in a conviction.2 In Jon Krakauer’s
2015 book Missoula: Rape and the Justice System in a College Town,
Krakauer attempts to find answers to why the systems that serve the pub-
lic—police, prosecutors, courts, and college disciplinary forums—fail when
it comes to prosecuting acquaintance rape. In exploring this issue, he fo-
cuses on half a dozen specific incidents of sexual assault and weaves in
* Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. Thanks to Anthony Johnstone, the Montana
Law Review, and the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana for organizing
the excellent symposium on campus sexual assault. Kevin Cole and Susan Ridgeway provided tremen-
dous feedback on this essay and Michelle Anderson, Elizabeth Foote, Linda McClain, and Catharine
Wells provided comments on prior drafts. I wish to thank Saba Habte and Dustin Dove for incredible
research assistance and Megan Timm, Marin Keyes, and Constance Van Kley for extraordinary editorial
assistance.
1. The reports of rape by non-strangers range from 72% to 82%. Perpetrators of Sexual Violence:
Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK (RAINN) (May 28, 2013), https://perma.cc/
FP29-T63P (reporting that 21% of rapes are by strangers, 43% by a friend or acquaintance, 2% by
relative, and 27% by spouse or partner for a total of 72% of attacks by those known to the victim); Facts
and Quotes, RAPE TREATMENT CENTER: UCLA MEDICAL CENTER, https://perma.cc/Q2N9-BCEC (citing
two reports that claim that 82% and 80% of rapes were by those known by the victim).
2. 97 of Every 100 Rapists Receive No Punishment, RAINN Analysis Shows, RAPE, ABUSE &
INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK (RAINN) (Mar. 27, 2012), https://perma.cc/QU4T-VG8X.
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larger issues of sexism, entitlement, systemic indifference, and political
forces, including the role of the Department of Justice in challenging en-
trenched practices in a county attorney’s office.3 This book surprised me in
two ways. As a preliminary matter, borrowing from the mythology that crit-
ics contend the term “date rape” perpetuates, I had assumed that rape on
college campuses would be “an unfortunate encounter in which the two
parties share culpability because of too much alcohol and too little clear
communication.”4 I was taken aback by how most of the sexual encounters
Krakauer described involved aggressive sexual conduct by men, which
could not be written off as mere poor judgment clouded by alcohol. The
other surprise for me was that it appears outdated to contend that juries do
not convict because the trials are a battle of the accused’s credibility against
the victim’s. In a revealing interview with a juror who acquitted the Univer-
sity of Montana’s football quarterback, the juror succinctly explained that
the jurors did not doubt the victim’s claim that she had been raped. But, to
convict the quarterback of a crime, the prosecution needed to provide proof
that he engaged in the prohibited conduct (known as actus reus, which is
defined in Montana as sex without consent) and that he knew the conduct
was without consent (known as mens rea, which is defined as the mental
state of knowledge).5 The juror noted that there was no proof the
quarterback had knowledge that the sex was without the woman’s consent.6
Because knowledge is a high standard to meet in criminal law, the juror’s
insight compels reconsidering how statutes define the culpable mental state
in the crime of rape. Although scholars and reformers have focused on dif-
ferent ways to define the culpable conduct in sexual assault, this article
criticizes the statutes’ routine reliance on knowledge as the culpable mental
state and takes from homicide law to introduce a different mental state,
malice, which more accurately captures the social harm that occurs in sex-
ual assault.
Part II provides a brief introduction into the criminal law concepts of
actus reus—what conduct is actionable—and mens rea—the mental state
attached to crime.  The crimes of homicide and theft are sophisticated and
nuanced, using various mental states and conduct to capture exactly what
3. JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA: RAPE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN A COLLEGE TOWN (2015).
4. David Lisak, Understanding the Predatory Nature of Sexual Violence, 14 SEXUAL ASSAULT
REPORT, Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 50 (citing scholars who argue that the term date rape perpetuates false
narratives around campus rape).
5. See infra nn.128–130 and accompanying text for citations to Montana law; see infra Part I(A)
for discussion of mens rea and actus reus; see also Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntari-
ness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 1548–52 (2013) (discussing the actus reus doctrine); Jeremy M.
Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 21, 22–27 (2001) (discussing mens rea).
6. KRAKAUER, supra note 3, at 116; see infra Part II(B)(2). R
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anti-social conduct is criminal. Furthermore, homicide and theft offer an
example of how the definitions of crime can change in response to changing
times to better fit current social norms.
Part III starts with the assumption that criminal law is best when it can
accurately cabin socially undesirable conduct as a crime and let alone law-
ful activity. Current definitions of rape offenses that focus on the actus reus
of force and non-consent fail to conform with this assumption. Defining
rape as a crime having an element of force was never designed to distin-
guish unwanted sex from wanted sex. At a time when all sex outside of
marriage was criminalized, the element of force was necessary to ensure
that a woman who reports being the victim of rape would not in fact be
unwittingly confessing to the crime of adultery (sex with a married person)
or fornication (sex with a single person).7 It then is of no surprise that in
acquaintance rape, the level of violence that constitutes the legal definition
of force is rarely present. In the absence of knives, guns, and threats, an
acquaintance rape that occurs from confusion, obtuseness, and entitlement
is not actionable as a forcible crime. As much as forcible rapes capture the
harm arising when a stranger attacks from behind the bushes, defining rape
by the force element does not capture the social harm found in all of un-
wanted sex.
Likewise, when rape law was reformed to define the actionable con-
duct in sexual assault as non-consent, this codification of the crime was
never meant to capture all forms of unwanted sex. Rather, legislatures lim-
ited non-consent to unwanted sex that arises in the specific context of
power imbalances that are enumerated by statute. For instance, most states
confine non-consent to a situation in which an age difference, state of intox-
ication, incapacity arising from mental or physical disability, or legal duty
of care existed between the assailant and victim.8
In these instances, the definitions of rape were grossly underinclusive
with respect to the harm arising in acquaintance rape, where neither force
nor power imbalance is present. This statement is not at all surprising given
that the social harm of unwanted sex was not the animating principal of the
crime’s development.
In Part IV I turn to the most common reform that is proposed to im-
prove the definition of the crime of rape: affirmative consent. Affirmative
consent laws are being proposed as alternatives to capture more unwanted
sex as crimes.9 The problem with these laws is that they are overinclusive.
These laws again disregard the difference between unwanted and wanted
sex, and instead focus on whether the parties communicated in the very
7. See infra Part I(D)(2).
8. See infra Part I(D)(3)(a).
9. See infra Part II(A).
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specific manner and method prescribed by statute. There is no doubt that
following the letter of the law will prevent a person from engaging in un-
wanted sex. A problem still arises, however, because there are numerous
acts of wanted sex where both parties do not communicate as required by
the statute, but neither party experiences the sexual encounter as unwanted.
The affirmative consent laws then raise grave concerns over selective and
arbitrary enforcement. Of more concern to this project, the affirmative con-
sent definitions further fail to use criminal law to clearly explain what is
and is not lawful activity.
The article then turns away from the actus reus and focuses on the
mens rea of rape offenses. Regardless of whether rape is defined by force or
non-consent, as illustrated in the Montana quarterback case, knowledge (or
general intent) is a common mental state used in defining rape and sexual
assault.10 This mental state is a critical problem, because proving what a
defendant knew is often the hardest part of criminal prosecution. As demon-
strated in Krakauer’s interview with a juror who acquitted the
quarterback,11 it is no longer accurate to contend that rape trials are simply
a contest between his word and hers. The criminal law instead requires
heightened proof that the defendant had affirmative knowledge that he was
proceeding without his partner’s consent. Under such a standard, it is possi-
ble for the jury to believe a woman’s claim that she was raped, but not find
sufficient evidence that the defendant knew the woman had not consented
to sex, which is necessary to hold the rapist liable.
The law of homicide recognizes this dilemma and, instead of requiring
that a defendant has knowledge that his conduct will result in the death of
another, introduces the mental state of malice—a callous disregard of an
objective risk that his conduct may result in serious bodily injury or death—
to make more deaths actionable.12 When a person shoots a gun into a crowd
and the bullet hits and kills another, the shooter can be convicted without
the prosecution proving the shooter knew he would or wanted to kill any
specific person. Rather, under the mental state of malice, the shooter is con-
victed when the prosecution establishes that the conduct of shooting a gun
10. See infra nn.128–130 and accompanying text for citations to Montana law; Kit Kinports, Rape
and Force: The Forgotten Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 755, 760 (2001) (“In rape cases involving
physical violence or express threats of physical harm, proof of the actus reus obviously does establish
mens rea with respect to force as well as nonconsent. A defendant who beat or threatened to kill his
victim could hardly raise a plausible argument that he did not know he was using force. But in other
circumstances, the defendant’s mens rea vis-a-vis force may be less clear, and it may therefore make a
difference whether a rape conviction requires proof that the defendant purposely intended to use force,
or whether it is enough that he knew he was exercising force, that the woman thought he was using
force, or that a reasonable person viewing the situation would have thought so.”).
11. See infra Part II(B)(2).
12. See infra Part II(B)(1).
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into a crowd of people was done with a wanton disregard for the objective
risk that such conduct could hurt another.
Rape by malice is a suggested means to get closer to the precise harm
that unwanted sex implicates. Criminalizing engagement in sex with a cal-
lous indifference to the risk that it may not be consensual imports a mens
rea from the homicide context. The mens rea of malice captures the anti-
social mindset that arises when one acts without regard to the objective risk
that one’s conduct poses.13 An assailant does not need to know that the
partner is not consenting. But to avoid liability, a person must care whether
consent is or is not present. The questions become what specific facts of the
sexual conduct were present—whether there was a limited prior sexual his-
tory, the partner was asleep, the partner was intoxicated, the partner only
had verbally communicated consent to kissing, the partner was crying—and
did the defendant callously disregard these facts in seeking sex without re-
gard to whether it was consensual.
II. A PRIMER ON ACTUS REUS AND MENS REA
As a quick primer on criminal law, a crime has two components: the
mens rea, which is a person’s mental state or bad thoughts, and the actus
reus, which is the bad conduct in which the person voluntarily engaged.14 A
crime is not defined simply by a bad result, but whether the defendant en-
gaged in the specific mens rea and actus reus proscribed by law.
A. Homicide’s Nuanced Response to Unlawful Killings
To illustrate, in the homicide context, many states define murder as an
unlawful killing of another person (actus reus) with premeditation, or an
intent to kill another (mens rea).15 When a wife who harbors hatred for her
husband and wishes to kill him places arsenic in her husband’s coffee and
the husband dies, she is prosecuted for premeditated murder because she
had the bad thoughts (intent to kill) coupled with the bad conduct (poison-
ing her husband). However, if a driver who parks her car kills a passing
cyclist when she opens her car door, the death of the cyclist cannot be pros-
ecuted as premeditated murder. The driver lacked an intent to kill, so even
though her conduct is directly responsible for the death of another, she does
not meet the proscribed mens rea of the offense. Likewise, a different
13. See infra Part II(B)(1).
14. See Miller, supra note 5, at 27 (“In all of the traditional crimes, as well as most modern crimes, R
there must exist a prohibited action or result (‘actus reus’) and a certain mental state (‘mens rea’).”).
15. Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 146–47 (1999) (“in
most American states, there are degrees of murder, and premeditation remains a very common dividing
line between murders of the first and second degree”).
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housewife can wish her husband dead and every day deliberately plan elab-
orate ways for his demise. If the husband is killed when a bus hits him, the
wife cannot be prosecuted for premeditated murder. There is a dead body
and a desire to kill, but the wife did not undertake any action. Her failure to
engage in any bad conduct makes her bad thoughts, standing alone, beyond
the reach of the criminal law. Lastly, a person can have an intent to kill
another and inject an overdose of morphine that stops the heart. But if that
person is a doctor who is engaging in physician-assisted suicide in a state
such as Oregon where it is legal,16 the doctor did not commit murder be-
cause the law recognizes that the death was a lawful, not unlawful, one.
These examples illustrate a number of important aspects of criminal
law. First, not every instance where one person kills another meets the defi-
nition of premeditated murder. A crime is not simply defined by its result,
but rather, a person is liable for homicide only when the specific mental
state and specific conduct occur at the same time. Second, in homicide, the
states have developed numerous crimes to capture the various wrongs of
intentional murder, unintentional manslaughter, and vehicular homicide.17
The driver who hits the cyclist may be prosecuted for reckless homicide or
manslaughter, but her actions do not meet the heightened definition of pre-
meditated murder. The criminal code reflects a sophisticated set of homi-
cide offenses to capture the different social wrongs and different degrees of
culpability that arise from the ways in which one person can cause the death
of another.
The value of homicide’s multi-tiered offenses is that each type of
homicide offense effectively categorizes which killings arise from danger-
ous individuals who planned and executed a killing, which ones are acci-
dents for which circumstances exist to justify culpability, and which ones
are tragedies that are outside of the law’s reach. The law properly holds
responsible people culpable but—equally importantly—does not sweep in
tragedies or lawful killings as criminal offenses. As set forth below, the
crime of rape lacks this nuance and ability to effectively separate unwanted
sex from legal activity.
16. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800 to 127.897.
17. Walter Dickey, David Schultz & James L. Fullin, Jr., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of
Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1323, 1325, 1329 (1989) (when discussing first
degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter—distinguished by intentional, reckless, and negli-
gent mental states—the authors comment that the gradations  “express[ ] virtually all of the principles
that are applied in the criminal law, especially a carefully delineated distinction among culpable mental
states”); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 994–95 (1932) (“The history of
homicide during the next few centuries is the story of the emergence of the mental element as a factor of
prime importance, the gradual freeing from criminal responsibility of those who killed without guilty
intent, and the separation of different kinds of homicide into more and less serious offenses dependent
upon the psychical element.”).
6
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B. Theft Offenses Also Are Precise and Nuanced to Capture
the Social Harm in Each Crime
It is a mistake to presume that a criminal law cannot keep pace with
changing social values and conduct. The crux of this article is that rape is a
failed offense because it has not reflected social changes in the manner that
other offenses have. Theft is an example that illustrates how effective crimi-
nal law can be in stopping socially undesirable conduct when various stat-
utes alter mental states and conduct to capture the nuance of the social
wrong. Theft offenses, like homicide, have numerous iterations that effec-
tively target the social harm arising in each form.18 Although the offense of
“thieving” can be traced to the Bible and through the Middle Ages, scholars
trace the origins of the modern common law crime of larceny to a 1473 case
from the Star Chamber.19 In the United States, larceny is generally defined
as the capture and asportation of property without the owner’s consent and
with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.20 For exam-
ple, both a shoplifter and a customer leave a grocery store with a loaf of
bread. Whereas the customer took possession with the store owner’s con-
sent during a commercial sale, the shoplifter took the bread without the
owner’s consent. The definition of larceny is effective because it can easily
draw a line between lawful and unlawful conduct that matches social norms
of desirable behavior (transferring possession through negotiation and the
marketplace) and undesirable conduct (theft).
It was not long, however, before the definition of larceny was exposed
as being too narrow. Starting with the famous case of The King v. Pear,21
the House of Lords realized that there was something important to recogniz-
ing that not all consent was equal. In 1779, an English man named Pear
rented a horse from the true owner. The owner consented to transfer posses-
sion of the horse to Mr. Pear. However, Mr. Pear did not take a trip with the
horse and instead sold the horse to another. Under a strict application of the
elements of larceny, no crime occurred because the true owner’s transfer of
18. See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 470–71 (1976)
(discussing the evolution of larceny into larceny-by-trick, embezzlement, and false pretenses and com-
menting on how the law “generated a continuous expansion of criminal liability for dishonest acquisi-
tions”); Michael J. Stephan et al., Identity Burglary, 13 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 401 (2009) (commenting
that “identity theft as a crime is a relatively nascent development in criminal law. . . due in large part to
technological advance, identity theft as an act has experienced a significant evolution in terms of both
scope and complexity”).
19. See Fletcher, supra note 18, at 477–81. R
20. “Common-law larceny is the felonious taking by trespass and carrying away by any person of
the goods or personal property of another, without the latter’s consent and with the felonious intent
permanently to deprive the owner of his property and to convert it to the taker’s own use.” N.C. v.
Carswell, 243 S.E.2d 911, 912 (N.C. Ct. App.) (quoting 8 STRONG’S N.C. INDEX 3D Larceny § 1
(1976)), rev’d, 249 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. 1978).
21. The King v. Pear, 168 Eng. Rep. 208, 1 Leach 212 (1779).
7
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possession to Mr. Pear was actionable only if it was done without the con-
sent of the owner. In this instance, the owner willingly consented to give the
horse to Mr. Pear. Instead of recommending an acquittal, however, the
House of Lords announced a new crime of larceny-by-trick, which recog-
nized that when an owner’s consent is procured by fraud, a crime involving
the wrongful deprivation of property has in fact occurred.22
Larceny and larceny-by-trick encountered technical limits when faced
with the conduct of a bank teller who, after dutifully recording a customer’s
deposit to the bank, pocketed the funds. In 1799, the English courts found
that neither larceny nor larceny-by-trick captured this conduct because, un-
like Mr. Pear’s horse, the bank never received possession of the deposit, a
condition precedent for the teller to have unlawfully taken possession from
the bank (or any other true owner of the funds).23 Due to the public outcry
of the teller’s acquittal, the English Parliament responded by creating a new
crime called embezzlement,24 which is the unlawful conversion of property
lawfully obtained from another.25 Parliament recognized that there should
be another type of crime that, unlike larceny, does not involve a trespassory
taking but a betrayal of trust, for which the elements of conversion and
appropriation were developed to capture.26
Since that time, state legislatures have effectively responded by rede-
fining theft offenses to fit circumstances arising in society. Consent cannot
fully divide lawful from unlawful conduct because an owner may volunta-
rily transfer possession where fraud, coercion, or force exist. Accordingly,
legislatures developed the crimes of false pretenses, extortion, and robbery
to capture the fraudulent or forceful inducement of consent.27 As property
interests became intangible, crimes such as theft of services and corruption
22. Id.; see also Possession and Custody in the Law of Larceny, 30 YALE L.J. 613, 614 (1921) (“In
1779 the doctrine of larceny by trick was introduced by Pear’s Case . . . .”).
23. Rex v. Bazeley, 168 Eng. Rep. 517, 2 Leach 835 (1799).
24. Fletcher, supra note 18, at 489 n.83. R
25. See Embezzlement—Appropriation by Agent of Funds Collected on Commission, 21 HARV. L.
REV. 287, 287–88 (1908) (comparing three cases where key facts determined if the employee was or
was not guilty of embezzlement).
26. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 24–25 (Oxford University Press 2000) (“It
is not entirely clear why this possibility for extending the scope of larceny never appealed to the same
judges who readily inflated the crime of larceny to cover [larceny by trick, false pretenses, and finders of
property who know the property does not belong to them].”).
27. Robbery Becomes Kidnapping, 3 STAN. L. REV. 156, 157 (1950) (“In 1901, California, follow-
ing the trend in other states, enacted Penal Code Section 209, the avowed purpose being to punish
kidnappings for ransom or extortion. Robbery was included because at that time, the Code definition of
‘extortion’ was limited to a taking with consent”); California v. Ashley, 267 P.2d 271, 279 (Cal. 1954)
(“Although the crimes of larceny by trick and device and obtaining property by false pretenses are much
alike, they are aimed at different criminal acquisitive techniques. Larceny by trick and device is the
appropriation of property, the possession of which was fraudulently acquired; obtaining property by
false pretenses is the fraudulent or deceitful acquisition of both title and possession.”).
8
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developed.28 With the advancement of the internet, identity theft and copy-
right infringement were reformed to capture the crimes that could exist in
the new virtual world but were unimaginable in the 1770s of England.29
State legislatures then either modified or developed new theft offenses to
ensure that the bad conduct arising in new circumstances was actionable.30
In addition to capturing bad conduct as new crimes, theft offenses
were effective in not sweeping in similar lawful conduct. From ten thou-
28. Paul J. Mass & Carl S. von Mehren, Cable Theft: The Problem, the Need for Useful State
Legislation, and A Proposed Solution for Georgia, 35 EMORY L.J. 643, 652 (1986) (discussing limita-
tions in current statutes and a proposal to capture the harm in cable theft):
The general theft of services statute prohibits a person from knowingly obtaining services,
accommodations, or entertainment, or the use of personal property made available only for
compensation, by deception with intent to avoid payment. Although this statute could be used
to prosecute cable theft, since cable services can be considered entertainment, the necessity of
proving knowledge, deception, and intent to avoid payment makes it difficult to use the statute
in cable theft cases.
See also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 400 (2010):
In 1909, Congress amended the [mail fraud] statute to prohibit [money or property]. . . .
Emphasizing Congress’ disjunctive phrasing, the Courts of Appeals, one after the other, inter-
preted the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ to include deprivations not only of money or
property, but also of intangible rights. . . . The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Shushan [v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110 (1941)] stimulated the development of an ‘honest-services’ doctrine.
Unlike fraud in which the victim’s loss of money or property supplied the defendant’s gain,
with one the mirror image of the other, see, e.g., United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 101
(C.A.2 1987), the honest-services theory targeted corruption that lacked similar symmetry.
While the offender profited, the betrayed party suffered no deprivation of money or property;
instead, a third party, who had not been deceived, provided the enrichment.
29. Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Identity Theft: A Primer, 19 MAR S.C. LAW 20, 23 (2008) (“In 1998,
Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrent Act (ITADA), which made identity theft a
federal crime.”); Grace Espinosa, Internet Piracy: Is Protecting Intellectual Property Worth Govern-
ment Censorship?, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 309, 309 (2011) (“Intellectual property law has strug-
gled to keep up with new technologies and the issues posed by new mediums of communication. With
the rise of the Internet, digital piracy has led to millions of dollars worth of losses in American intellec-
tual property. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (‘DMCA’) was intended to address some of the
problems related to online infringement; however, at the time the DMCA was drafted, the legislature did
not foresee that peer-to-peer file sharing software would give millions of users instant illegal access to
copyrighted works.”); Newberger v. Florida, 641 So. 2d 419, 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing
conviction and suggesting that the legislature enact a statute like other states have adopted to capture
computer crime that occurred but fell outside of current law).
30. The crime of homicide has a similar history of matching social norms regarding what conduct is
or is not undesirable. At common law, a cuckolded husband who killed his wife or her paramour was
afforded the defense of self-defense, which mitigated or eliminated liability. As women became equal,
the injuries to honor were perceived anew as an inappropriate reaction arising from fragile notion of
masculinity. As such self-defense was no longer categorically afforded to spouses avenging adultery
with death. See generally Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CAL. L. REV. 273, 284 (2015)
(“Some critics take the hardline position that any adultery killing, even one as sanitized as Gere’s,
reflects masculinist norms of violence and gender subordination and should not be mitigated.”). Like-
wise, contemporary definitions of murder are shaped by the societal norms in myriad ways. See gener-
ally Joanne Pedone, Filling the Void: Model Legislation for Fetal Homicide Crimes, 43 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 77 (2009) (discussing the various statutory frameworks defining fetal homicide and
whether they take into account the definition’s effect on abortion rights).
9
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sand feet up, theft cannot be defined as simply the transfer of property to
another because our society requires the lawful transfer of property in the
form of negotiation, commercial sales, borrowing, sharing, and gifting. As
each new theft offense developed, it carefully carved out bad conduct from
the realm of lawful transfers that continue to occur in society. Theft of-
fenses thus are specific enough to reach numerous forms of wrongdoing
without trampling on lawful conduct involved in transferring property to
another.31
III. DUE TO SEXISM, CURRENT DEFINITIONS OF RAPE HAVE NOT
EVOLVED TO CAPTURE THE EXACT HARM OF UNWANTED SEX
Rape is currently defined by the actus reus of force or non-consent.32
As illustrated below, definitions of both arose from historical circumstances
in which the crime of rape was tainted by sexist notions that, one, a woman
may not have sex outside of marriage, and two, if the crime was more
broadly defined, innocent men would be falsely accused.33 The fatal flaw in
continuing to repurpose these elements as the defining features of rape is
that they fail to capture many instances of unwanted sex as a crime.
A. Rape Law Does Not Accurately Differentiate Unwanted Sex
from Lawful Activity
Simply put, rape law lacks the precision, sophistication, and evolution
that homicide and theft law have undergone. As a result, the contemporary
definitions of rape offenses fail to capture the social harm of unwanted sex.
31. See generally David Gray & Chelsea Jones, In Defense of Specialized Theft Statutes, 47 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 861, 878–82 (2013) (in discussing the evolution of theft offenses and the debate over
specialized or consolidated offenses, “the essence of Professor Green’s position is that not all property
can be stolen and only some interferences with property rights can accurately be categorized as ‘theft’”);
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 412 (1999) (“More important for
present purposes, however, this regulation, and the numerous other regulations and statutes littering this
field [in white collar crime], demonstrate that this is an area where precisely targeted prohibitions are
commonplace, and where more general prohibitions have been qualified by numerous exceptions. Given
that reality, a statute in this field that can linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel
should reasonably be taken to be the latter. Absent a text that clearly requires it, we ought not expand
this one piece of the regulatory puzzle so dramatically as to make many other pieces misfits. As dis-
cussed earlier, not only does the text here not require that result; its more natural reading forbids it.”).
32. Kinports, supra note 10, at 755–56. R
33. Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled
and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003) (commenting that a “major force” behind the formula-
tion of Model Penal Code’s definition of rape “was to protect the defendant against unfair prosecution”).
Indeed, still today, the Editor’s Notes to the MPC definitions of rape justify its differentiation of crimes
based on whether the victim was a “voluntary social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the
crime,” whether she “had not previously permitted him sexual liberties,” and proposing that the victim’s
“promiscuity” with others was a defense to the conduct engaged by the rapist. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1 Editor’s n. § 213.1.
10
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The criminal law works best when it is able to effectively create a clear
separation between lawful and unlawful conduct.34 As demonstrated in Il-
lustration 1, in the context of rape, that means the criminal law should ef-
fectively capture unwanted sex as a crime and leave wanted sex as non-
actionable.
Illustration 1: Ideal
Lawful
sex
Unlawful
rape
When the law works, all of the bad conduct of unwanted sex will fall
in a definition of the crime of rape, and the good conduct of wanted sex will
be left alone as lawful conduct. The line in the illustration represents the
ideal conviction rates. Of note, it is slightly to the right of center to reflect
that, under the presumption of innocence, when there is reasonable doubt
over where the conduct at the margins fall, slightly more criminal conduct
will be non-actionable to avoid having an innocent person be found
guilty.35
Illustration 2: Current 3% Conviction Rate
Lawful
sex
Unlawful
rape
At a 3% conviction rate,36 the current definitions of rape are failing
tremendously to meet this ideal. Here the line is far to the right, barely
capturing any of the unlawful rape as an actionable offense.
There can be no doubt that sexism is to blame for stunting the under-
standing of this crime. Since Roman times, rape has been recognized as a
crime, but not because the conduct violated a woman’s sexual autonomy or
consent. Rather, rape was a crime because the act violated a woman’s chas-
tity. The victim was never the woman; rather, the law redressed rape be-
34. See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 270 (1987).
35. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination
of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”).
36. See 97 of Every 100 Rapists Receive No Punishment, supra note 2. R
11
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cause the rapist had injured the honor of the victim’s father and brother.37
The origins of rape do not align with the contemporary concerns over the
need to criminalize unwanted sex. As set forth below, the contemporary
actus reus of force and non-consent fail to capture the social harm that un-
wanted sexual activity presents.
B. The Actus Reus of Force Does Not Capture the Actual Social Harm
of Acquaintance Rape
1. Rape by Force Does Not Capture the Harm in Unwanted Sex
When first introduced in the United States, the crime of rape was de-
fined as having an actus reus of force and lack of consent.38 Although the
statutes mention consent, as explained below, the crux of the crime was
whether a man in fact used violent force and the woman displayed convinc-
ing levels of physical resistance to prove her lack of consent to separate the
offense from societal norms surrounding lawful sex. Maryland’s statute
from 1980 is representative, defining rape in the second degree as a person
having “vaginal intercourse with another person by force or threat of force
against the will and without the consent of the other person.”39 A few pre-
liminary observations should be made.
First, Maryland, like all other states, recognized the marital rape ex-
emption, which meant that husbands were legally incapable of raping their
wives.40 Between 1975 and 1993, all states formally abolished the marital
37. Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Vio-
lence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 57, n.198 (2008) (In discussing the
efforts to reform international law, Professor Halley observed, “There was complete consensus that the
pictorial output of [International Humanitarian Laws]’s most authoritative statements of law must not
legitimate and entrench the ideas that the rape of a woman harmed her because of its meaning to the men
in her family or culture, or that it harmed a wife, daughter, or sister because it impugned a husband’s,
father’s, or brother’s honor. Charlesworth, for instance, objected that Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, ‘assumes that women should be protected from sexual crimes because they implicate a
woman’s honor, reinforcing the notion of women as men’s property, rather than because they constitute
violence.’”).
38. Kinports, supra note 10, at 755 (“The crime of rape has traditionally been defined to require R
proof of both force on the part of the defendant and lack of consent on the part of the victim. In the
words of Blackstone, rape is ‘carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.’”); Michelle J.
Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962 (1998) (“Rape law has
traditionally emphasized a woman’s physical resistance to evaluate her lack of consent and the defen-
dant’s use of force. At common law, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the woman
resisted her assailant to the utmost of her physical capacity to prove that an act of sexual intercourse was
rape.”).
39. MD. CODE ANN., Crimes & Punishments § 463(a)(1) (repealed 2002), cited in Maryland v.
Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 720 (Md. 1981).
40. Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law’s Failure to Keep Up with Domestic
Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1819, 1819 (2011).
12
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rape exemption as a doctrine providing full immunity to the husband.41 The
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code (“MPC”), which is usually
recognized, if not praised, for introducing salient legal reforms, breaks from
its track record of being a model of laws by still recommending that states
codify the marital rape exemption.42 This definition has been met with de-
cades of criticism to no avail.43 Although no state currently follows the
MPC’s recommendation to codify this exemption, a number of states follow
the MPC’s recommendations to provide lesser offenses or lesser punish-
ment when the defendant is married to his victim, when the defendant and
victim live together, and when the defendant and victim have engaged in
prior lawful acts of sexual intercourse.44
Second, by defining the actus reus of rape to be “vaginal intercourse,”
Maryland, like most states, codified that only women could be victims and
only men could be perpetrators of rape. Indeed, it was not until 2012 that
the federal government expanded its definition of rape to account for same-
sex rape and the victimization of men.45
Third, a rape legally occurred when the man forced a woman to submit
to sexual conduct. The degree of force was quite high, usually requiring a
label of violence that is foreign by today’s standard. In 1982, in Illinois v.
Rosario,46 the appellate court of Illinois reversed a conviction of rape for
insufficient evidence that the defendant used force. In Rosario, a man drove
to his girlfriend’s workplace at around 4:30 p.m. to pick her up from work.
The girlfriend was 17 years old and mostly spoke Spanish rather than En-
glish. In the car, she broke up with him. He responded by suggesting that
they have dinner. He then drove to his workplace where he had forgotten
his wallet. Once they arrived at the parking lot of the assailant’s workplace,
41. In 1975, South Dakota was the first state to abolish the marital rape exemption and, in 1993,
North Carolina was the last. See J.C. Barden, Marital Rape: Drive for Tougher Laws Is Pressed, N.Y.
TIMES (May 13, 1987), https://perma.cc/UW4Y-JB9L; Sarah M. Harless, From the Bedroom to the
Courtroom: The Impact of Domestic Violence Law on Marital Rape Victims, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 305, 318
(2003).
42. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (2015) (In relevant part the crime of rape is defined as a crime
that occurs when “A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if:
[certain conduct occurs] . . . .”) (emphasis added).
43. See Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look at the
Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 851 (1996) (“It is difficult to separate this rationale from the old
theory that a woman who marries or agrees to cohabit with a man thereby consents to all intercourse,
including that which is coerced.”); see also Denno, supra note 33, at 213–14; Hava Dayan & Emanuel R
Gross, Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Battered Women Claiming Self-Defense and a Legislative
Proposal to Amend Section 3.04(2)(B) of the U.S. Model Penal Code, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 17, 30–31
(2015).
44. See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences:
A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1521 (2003).
45. Roni Caryn Rabin, Men Struggle for Rape Awareness, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012), https://per
ma.cc/EM57-93ZC.
46. 443 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
13
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he said he was tired of the victim saying no and physically grabbed her.
They struggled for 30 minutes; he hit her in the face, pulled down her pants,
and had sexual intercourse with her. The defendant retrieved his wallet
while the victim stayed in the car, and before driving her home, he raped
her a second time.47
By present-day standards, there is no question that this conduct is un-
wanted sex. I think most would presume that a physical struggle and hitting
a person’s face constitutes what the term force should mean. In 1982, this
was not a shared understanding of the term force. Rather, the appellate
court reversed the conviction, in part because the “defendant made no
threats of physical violence whatsoever.”48 What this heightened standard
reveals is that this crime was highly underinclusive with respect to which
bad acts were in fact prosecuted as crimes. In addition, the definition of
forcible rape was not grounded in what contemporary norms define as the
nature and harm of unwanted sex.
Fourth, the element of a defendant’s force was accompanied by an
element requiring that a woman proved that she had resisted—often with
her utmost ability—her attacker’s use of force during intercourse.49 Re-
turning to the Rosario case, the appellate court also overturned the rape
conviction for want of proof of resistance. In its reasoning, the young wo-
man had not displayed adequate resistance to prove that she did not consent
to the sex because she remained in the car after the first rape instead of
fleeing (her explanation of being ashamed was not accepted), she did not
yell for help during either attack or when they stopped at a gas station (be-
cause she believed her boyfriend’s threat that he would not drive her home
if she did), and during the intercourse, she did not bite, scratch, or kick.50
In the first attempt at rape reform that began in the 1980s, the element
of resistance was dropped from the definition of rape.51 One of the most
47. Id. at 274–77.
48. Id. at 276.
49. Anderson, supra note 38, at 962–64 (“Rape law has traditionally emphasized a woman’s physi- R
cal resistance to evaluate her lack of consent and the defendant’s use of force. . . . For many women, the
utmost resistance requirement made rape nearly impossible to prove. Most rape victims could not meet
the rigid standard of physically resisting an assailant to the utmost of their physical capacity and main-
taining that level of resistance throughout the sexual act. The utmost resistance requirement eventually
came under intense scrutiny because of its harmful effect on victims. Many states thereafter decided to
change the utmost resistance requirement”).
50. Rosario, 443 N.E.2d at 275–76.
51. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 967: R
Eventually, however, many other states eliminated the formal resistance requirement alto-
gether, concluding that prosecutors should be able to establish that a rape occurred even in the
absence of any resistance by the woman. The Model Penal Code has also eliminated resistance
as a legal prerequisite for a rape conviction. Thirty-one state statutes as well as the District of
Columbia Code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice do not mention resistance in the
statutory language describing rape. Six more states explicitly note in their criminal codes that
14
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pointed criticisms of the resistance element was the expectation that a vic-
tim resist rape through violence. This expectation of resistance arose from a
misguided assumption of what a reasonable man would do in a bar fight,
rather than what a reasonable woman in fact does—or should do—during
the fear and trauma experienced during rape to avoid further injury or harm
to herself.52 The resistance element was viewed as an anomaly in that no
other crime, such as robbery or assault, required a victim’s resistance to
prove that the defendant was culpable.53 Further, there was concern that
requiring this element was actually requiring a victim to risk serious bodily
injury or death to prove she was in fact being raped.54 Legislatures re-
physical resistance is not required to substantiate a rape charge. This last step in the history of
the place of resistance in rape law—omitting a resistance requirement altogether—appears to
be a major change. However, the formal elimination of a resistance requirement from codified
law has often been a victory more apparent than real. Although resistance is not formally
required in these states, courts today often evaluate a woman’s actions in the same way as they
did when resistance was required.
Only Louisiana still requires a showing of resistance “to the utmost” to sustain a charge of aggravated
rape. However, aggravated rape can also be met if the rapist uses a dangerous weapon. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:42(A)(1)–(3) (2016) (“[A] rape committed . . . where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual inter-
course is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or
more of the following circumstances: (1) When the victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose
resistance is overcome by force. (2) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of
great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution. (3) When the victim is
prevented from resisting the act because the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.”).
52. See Rusk v. Maryland, 406 A.2d 624, 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (Wilner, J., dissenting),
rev’d, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981). In critiquing the initial reversal of the conviction, the dissenting appel-
late judge criticized the majority’s focus on the victim’s lack of physical resistance as proof of consent.
Judge Wilner noted:
The most common type of resistance offered by victims is Verbal. Note: verbal resistance Is
resistance! In cases arising in the large cities, only 12.7% Of the victims attempted flight, and
only 12% Offered physical resistance. The reason for this is apparent from the next thing
learned: that “(r)ape victims who resisted were more likely to be injured than ones who did
not.” The statistics showed, for rapes in large cities, that, where physical resistance was of-
fered, over 71% Of the victims were physically injured in some way, 40% Requiring medical
treatment or hospitalization. Said the Report: “These results indicate one possible danger of
the popular notion (and some statutory requirements) that a victim of an attack should resist to
her utmost.
Id. (quoting Battelle Memorial Institute Law and Justice Study Center Report (1978)).
53. Id. at 633 (in criticizing the majority’s decision that discounted evidence of coercion as suffi-
cient amount of force, the dissent argued, “If [the defendant] had desired, and [the victim] had given, her
wallet instead of her body, there would be no question about appellant’s guilt of robbery. Taking the car
keys under those circumstances would certainly have supplied the requisite threat of force or violence
and negated the element of consent. No one would seriously contend that because she failed to raise a
hue and cry she had consented to the theft of her money. Why then is such life-threatening action
necessary when it is her personal dignity that is being stolen?”).
54. Anderson, supra note 38, at 958 (“One reason that only 13% of rape victims physically fight R
back against their sexual attackers is that they have been warned that fighting back will result in their
own serious bodily injury or death. A number of rape victims have testified in rape trials that they had
heard and believed this warning. As one rape victim said: ‘I remember talking with people about rape
and they always said not to resist . . . that a female could be killed, beaten, or mutilated. I didn’t want
that to happen.’ Many police departments have explicitly discouraged women from active, physical
15
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sponded to these criticisms by redefining the crime of rape as occurring
without the element of resistance.55
Requiring a victim’s resistance as proof that sex was unwanted is at
odds with how our society understands the harm of unwanted sex. Rape by
force was not concerned with nuanced questions of consent because it was a
crime focused more on stopping false accusations against men than adjudi-
cating real crimes committed by them.56
2. Rape by Force Developed when All Non-Marital Sex Was
Criminalized and Non-Procreative Marital Sex Was Regulated
Defining rape only by force and resistance, limiting violations to vagi-
nal penetration, and giving immunity to husbands to rape their wives is
ridiculous and offensive by today’s standards. But when this crime was cre-
ated, it was not focused on remedying the social problem of unwanted sex.
Rather, it is critical to understand that rape by force was part of a larger
regulatory scheme where sex outside of marriage was criminalized and non-
procreative sex within marriage was regulated.
One important factor is that up until the 1960s, when Griswold v. Con-
necticut57 carved out a penumbra of privacy from state regulation, sex
outside of marriage was criminalized.58 The person who had sex outside of
resistance, and instead encouraged women to employ ‘passive resistance’ and to do ‘what you were
taught to do as girls growing up.’”) (footnotes omitted).
55. See id.
56. The existing comments to the proposed crime of rape found in the MPC illustrate this problem.
For example, the MPC recommends a defense to the crime of rape when the woman had prior “promis-
cuous” sex with other men. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(3) (2015) (“It is a defense to prosecution under
Section 213.3 and paragraphs (6), (7) and (8) of Section 213.4 for the actor to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the alleged victim had, prior to the time of the offense charged, engaged promiscu-
ously in sexual relations with others.”). Even more offensive, the MPC requires corroboration of the
victim’s testimony and instructions to the jury that the victim may be emotionally unstable. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (2015) (“No person shall be convicted of any felony under this Article upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. Corroboration may be circumstantial. In any prosecution
before a jury for an offense under this Article, the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a
victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness
and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in
private.”) (emphasis added); see also Denno, supra note 33, at 207 (“Only because of the passage of R
time, the Code’s sexual offense provisions and Commentaries now misrepresent the progressive think-
ing of the Code’s reporters. For these reasons, I think the Model Penal Code’s sexual offense provisions
should be pulled, revised, and replaced.”).
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
58. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was the first case to establish a fundamental
right to privacy in the context of a married couple’s access to procreation.  Over time, the Supreme
Court invalidated numerous other regulations that were deemed to be unwarranted intrusions over deci-
sions around adult intimacy; see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (criminalization of interra-
cial marriages); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (criminalization of providing contraception to
unmarried persons); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (criminalization of sodomy laws that
targeted only same-sex intimacy).
16
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a marital relationship was punished (either for a felony or misdemeanor) for
the crimes of fornication—sex between unmarried adults—or adultery—
sex outside of marriage where both parties were married to others.59 In
these prosecutions, a person’s marital status was a critical element of the
crime. Defendants routinely would cite their own or their partner’s marital
status as a defense to the charged crimes.60
Illicit cohabitation—the crime of people of the opposite sex living to-
gether—was also criminalized out of concerns that unmarried individuals
were having sex.61 These statutes gained popularity after the Civil War as a
means to harass individuals in interracial relationships62 and members of
the Church of the Latter Day Saints before the church banned polygamist
practices.63 Despite their nefarious origins, by the 1960s, the majority of
59. Hopgood, 45 S.E.2d at 716.
60. Id. The Court granted a motion for a new trial on the basis that there was insufficient evidence
to establish the crimes of fornication and adultery. The charge of fornication was not supported because
“the proof shows that one of the parties was married at the time the offense is alleged to have been
committed; therefore, a verdict of guilty was contrary to the evidence.” Although not charged, the Court
observed that it could not construe the indictment to allege the crime of adultery because to sustain a
charge, “[t]he evidence must show that the accused and the other person alleged to have participated in
the criminal act were married persons.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
61. Matthew J. Smith, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discrimination in Housing Against Unmarried
Couples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1992) (“One of the most significant changes has occurred
in the criminal law. Historically, most states criminalized cohabitation. Today, most states have repealed
these criminal statutes. In addition, many states have decriminalized fornication.”); Unlawful cohabita-
tion became a crime in the United States with the enactment of the Edmunds Act in 1882. Erin P. B.
Zasada, Civil Rights—Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited: Living in Sin in North Dakota?
Not Under My Lease North Dakota Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 78 N.D. L. REV. 539, 541
(2002) (“Under the Edmunds Act [of 1882], prosecution of polygamists was facilitated through the
creation of a new offense called unlawful cohabitation. According to the Act, a male committed the
crime of unlawful cohabitation when he cohabited with more than one woman.”); United States v.
Higgerson, 46 F. 750, 751 (C.C.D. Idaho 1891) (“The crime of unlawful cohabitation is the living with
two or more women as wives; of treating and associating with them as such; the giving to the world the
appearance that the marital relation exists with them. It is the living with them in the habit and repute of
marriage.”).
62. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 70–91 (Pantheon Books 2003) (discussing various laws and cases criminalizing interracial
relationships from 1876 to the 1950s).
63. See generally Utah v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 764, 773 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J, dissenting)
(when addressing challenges to polygamy law, discussing the history by which the federal government
conditioned Utah’s statehood on its criminalization of polygamy within the LDS church. “Specifically,
the majority emphasizes some delegates’ concern that the federal government intended, through the
Enabling Act, not only to prevent Utah from recognizing polygamous unions as valid marriages, but also
to require that the state impose criminal penalties on polygamy.”); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d
1170, 1193 (D. Utah 2013), vacated 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (although the case involved a
religion that was separate and apart from the LDS church, the district court judge discussed the anti-LDS
animus that formed the basis of the polygamy laws of the late 1800s. “Of course, Reynolds held that
Congress’s long history of specifically targeting Mormons based on the fear that their practice of polyg-
amy posed a threat to American democracy, see Holm, 2006 UT at ¶ 167 & n.20, 137 P.3d at 771
(Durham, C.J., dissenting), and the resulting federal legislation prohibiting polygamy did not violate the
Mormons’ right to the free exercise of their religion.”).
17
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states had enacted and used them against cohabitating couples.64 Even
through the 2000s, these statutes were invoked in various property, intes-
tacy, and landlord-tenant disputes as evidence of legitimate public policy
and morals.65
In this context, the force and resistance elements served an essential
function. Without it, a victim of rape who was not married to her attacker
would turn her victim statement into a confession to the crimes of fornica-
tion or adultery.66 Although this absurdity is no longer a part of U.S. law, in
2013, a Norwegian tourist visiting Dubai was imprisoned for adultery after
reporting that she had been raped in public.67
In states that limit the definition of rape by only having a forcible
compulsion element, a victim of unwanted sex arising from a defendant’s
coercion, confusion, or cluelessness has no recourse. As a result, the numer-
ous—and, arguably, the majority of—situations in which acquaintance rape
occurs without physical violence are non-actionable under law. Relevant
here, one of the most important criticisms is that defining unwanted sex by
only the elements of force and resistance captures the crime of the stranger
64. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples,
7 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 141 (2005) (“When the Model Penal Code [MPC] was published in 1962,
most states in the United States criminalized nonmarital cohabitation.”).
65. Katherine C. Gordon, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: When
Strings Will Attach and How to Prevent Them—A State Survey, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 245, 253 (1999)
(observing that some “states refuse to recognize property agreements or rights arising between unmar-
ried cohabitants for two reasons: such relationships are against public policy and cohabitation remains a
crime in some states.”); One of the most famous examples was a North Dakota Supreme Court decision
from 2001, holding that landlords could lawfully refuse to rent to unmarried tenants. See N.D. Fair
Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551, 553 (N.D. 2001); see also Kari E. Hong, Obergefell’s
Sword: The Liberal State Interest in Marriage, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1425–27 (2016) (discussing
other state regulations used to discourage sex outside of marriage by penalizing the children of unmar-
ried parents with the substantial legal disadvantages arising from illegitimacy and discouraging non-
procreative sex in marriages by punishing doctors who provided information or access to contraception).
66. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1998) (“[A]s Kristin Bumiller
puts it—the woman’s nonconsent was the element that divided one heterosexual crime from another,
namely, the woman’s nonconsent distinguished the man’s crime (rape) from the couple’s crime (fornica-
tion or adultery). (In the former world, the parties’ marriage—not their consent to the intercourse—was
the element that distinguished lawful from unlawful sex.) The meaning of nonconsent (and, concomi-
tantly, of consent) in the context of sexual encounters necessarily would be conditioned by the fact that
it served this function. Moreover, contrary to the political assumptions that permeate the modern critique
of rape law, in a world in which all nonmarital intercourse is criminalized, we would not expect or desire
law enforcement authorities to approach a report of sexual misconduct with the conviction that, if an
offense had occurred, the man inevitably would turn out to be the guilty party. Rather, given the range of
potentially applicable offenses, the authorities at least would be obliged to consider whether, and might
even be predisposed to believe that, both the male and the female participants shared responsibility for
the criminal intercourse.”) (footnotes omitted).
67. See Nicola Goulding et al., Dubai Rule Pardons Norwegian Woman Convicted After She Re-
ported Rape, CNN (July 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/L34V-WHQK (After international outcry, the rape
victim was pardoned for the crime of unlawful sex outside of marriage. With her pardon, her rapist too
was released from prison).
18
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jumping out of the bushes, but it does not capture the social harm that oc-
curs in the more than three-fourths of rapes in which the victim knows his
or her assailant.68
C. The Actus Reus of Non-Consent Does Not Capture the Actual
Social Harm of Acquaintance Rape
1. Non-Consent Is Limited to Power Imbalances
The next wave of reform sought to replace the element of force with an
element of non-consent when defining unwanted sex. As a preliminary mat-
ter, most if not all of the states retain some sort of aggravated rape offense
that is meant to capture the harm arising when a rapist uses a weapon or
inflicts serious bodily injury on the victim. Force is obviously the actus reus
used in these crimes.69  But numerous states also have included a lesser
degree of rape that, in many jurisdictions, is defined by the absence of con-
sent.70
The difficulty in defining rape through the element of non-consent is
that it is a limited actus reus. It is not simply a question of whether the
sexual intercourse occurred with the victim’s consent. To the contrary, for
the most part, states define this element as involving a power differential
between the victim and defendant, usually arising out of age, state of intoxi-
cation, incapacity arising from a mental or physical disability, or specific
contexts such as the defendant having a legal duty of care over the victim.
For instance, Alabama defines rape in the second degree through two sub-
sections: the first criminalizes “sexual intercourse” between someone who
is at least 16 years old and a child who is between the ages of 16 and 12; the
second criminalizes sexual intercourse between someone who “is incapable
of consent by reason of being mentally defective.”71 Alaska defines sexual
assault in the third degree as including the situation whereby an assailant is
68. See supra note 1.
69. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.30 (2016) (Illinois’ statute heightens the offense of rape
to aggravated rape if the defendant uses a weapon, inflicts serious bodily harm during the rape, or rapes
a particularly vulnerable victim such as a child or an elderly or disabled person).
70. For instance, Illinois defines “Criminal Sexual Assault” as having an actus reus of “force or
threat of force” or a non-consent actus reus, in which a family member is the assailant or the defendant
knows that the victim is unable to understand or give consent. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20 (2016).
Iowa divides the crimes of sexual assault into degrees. The first-degree arises when the defendant
“causes another serious injury.” IOWA CODE § 709.2 (2016). A second-degree sexual assault occurs
when the defendant uses a weapon or force or the victim is under 12. IOWA CODE § 709.3 (2016). A
third-degree sexual assault arises when rape occurs by force or in one of ten circumstances of non-
consent that include a victim’s disability based on age, member of the assailant’s household, or under
the influence of specific substances. IOWA CODE § 709.4 (2016).
71. See ALA. CODE § 13A–6–62(a)(2)–(2) (2016).
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employed by the state as a law enforcement or probation officer and “en-
gages in sexual intercourse” knowing that the victim is in state custody.72
This parsing of non-consent as more akin to an exploitation of power
captures an important social harm, but again does not extend to all forms of
unwanted sex. A primary problem of limiting consent to this actus reus is
that most states accompany these crimes with general intent (if a common
law jurisdiction) or knowledge (if an MPC jurisdiction). With such a mens
rea, the defendant actually must know of the existence of the facts that
create the power differential. In Ohio, for instance, the legislature criminal-
izes a person’s conduct as rape if he
engage[s] in sexual conduct with another . . . when . . . [t]he other person’s
ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or
physical condition . . . and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the other person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially im-
paired . . . .73
In 2010, in Ohio v. Hatten,74 a young woman identified as A.R. went to a
bar with her roommate. The woman was 5’0" tall and weighed 120 pounds.
Over the course of a six-hour time span, she consumed half a pitcher of
beer, three cans of beer, and seven shots of liquor. She and her roommate
returned home, and a neighbor named Hatten stopped by and invited them
both to his apartment to watch a movie. At that point in time, the versions
of events diverged. A.R. claimed that Hatten invited her to his bedroom.
Without her consent, he engaged in penetration, and she fled his apartment.
By 7:00 a.m., she was at a hospital receiving an examination by a Sexual
Assault Nurse Examiner.
Of note, the jury convicted Mr. Hatten of rape, but on appeal, the con-
viction was reversed. The appellate court noted that the prosecutor had
failed to introduce evidence that the man knew that the woman had con-
sumed as much alcohol as she had that evening.75 The record lacked evi-
dence that the victim exhibited any outward signs of alcohol impairment
(no stumbling, no slurring).76 The court in turn held that Mr. Hatten could
not be found liable for the crime of rape.
Starting with the assumption that A.R. was telling the truth, these facts
expose a couple of problems with the non-consent formulations. The first is
that non-consent is narrowly written to include only specific instances of
power imbalances enumerated by statute. Assuming that the facts were true,
it is disturbing that Hatten’s conduct is non-actionable if A.R. was sober
because the reach of the statute does not include penetration when the as-
72. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.425(a)(4) (West 2016).
73. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2016).
74. 927 N.E.2d 632, 635–36, 638 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
75. Id. at 641, 647.
76. Id. at 637, 640.
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sailant knows that the victim has not given affirmative consent. It is only if
she was intoxicated and nonconsenting that the rape may be criminal.
The second, which will be discussed in more detail below, is that the
incapacity prong has a mistake-of-fact defense. Because the mens rea is
knowledge, a defendant will escape liability if he had no actual knowledge
of the circumstances—which focuses not on whether sex is unwanted, but
whether the defendant had knowledge of the victim’s impairment. Hatten
then illustrates how the element of non-consent is underinclusive in render-
ing significant types of unwanted sex as criminal.
2. The Mistake-of-Fact Defense
Another notable limitation of the actus reus of non-consent is that an
accused can only be convicted upon a showing that he knew he had sex
without the consent of his partner. For instance, New Jersey—ironically one
of the states that pioneered the movement to reform rape laws to abandon
the traditional actus reus of force—codified the mistake-of-fact defense in
the following manner. In directing the jury on how to consider evidence, the
following instructions are given:
You must decide whether the defendant’s alleged act of penetration was un-
dertaken in circumstances that led the defendant reasonably to believe that the
victim had freely given affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual
penetration. Simply put, affirmatively given permission means the victim did
or said something which would lead a reasonable person to believe [he/
she] was agreeing to engage in the act of sexual penetration, and freely
given permission means the victim agreed of [his/her] own free will to engage
in the act of sexual penetration.77
Instead of reforming rape law to turn attention away from whether the
victim resisted with the expected amount of force, the new non-consent
statutes keeps the focus on what the victim did or did not do to communi-
cate “consent.” The jury was—and still is—directed to scrutinize the vic-
tim’s actions to determine whether she should have been more clear, more
communicative, or more direct to avoid permitting the defendant to infer,
assume, or presume consent. What is troubling with this conception of rape
is illuminated by the fact that shoplifters are not permitted a defense that the
store owner’s seductive display of goods and promises to buy one, get one
free invited a reasonable mistake that payment was not required for the
goods that were stolen. Rape victims, however, retain the burden to prove
that their attackers were rapists, and not simply honest men who could not
have known better.
77. N.J. STANDARD CRIM. JURY INSTR. 2C:14–2a(3) (2011) (emphasis added, square brackets in
original).
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The prevalence of the mistake-of-fact defense arises from the reality
that rape is defined in most states as a crime with a knowledge mens rea.
Because knowledge is an element of the crime, it is understandable why
criminal law permits the defendant to raise the defense that he did not have
reasonable knowledge that he lacked the victim’s consent to engage in
sex.78 A number of states codify this defense.79 In others, the judiciary has
written in the mistake-of-fact defense in order to have the rape statutes
comport with due process.80
78. See Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In a situation of alleged “date rape,” the
alleged rapist may have thought the woman was consenting to have sex with him, though she was not.
And if his mistake was reasonable, that is a defense under Indiana law, just as in the parallel case of self-
defense in a prosecution for murder. . . .”); California v. Alvarez, 246 Cal. App. 4th 989, 1001 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2016) (noting that on the facts of the case, there was no misinstruction that interfered with the
defendant’s “defense of consent based on a reasonable mistake of fact”); Oregon v. Simonov, 368 P.3d
11, 15 n.3 (Or. 2016) (“[I]f lack of consent is based on the victim’s incapacity, then an honest mistake,
even if unreasonable, will excuse the defendant’s conduct, meaning that the applicable mental state is
knowingly.”) (citing Or. Rev. Stat. 163.325(3) (providing that, in such circumstances, “it is an affirma-
tive defense for the defendant to prove that at the time of the alleged offense the defendant did not know
of the facts or conditions responsible for the victim’s incapacity to consent”)); see generally CA. JURY
INSTR.—CRIM. 10.65 (2016) (square brackets in original) for a variation of New Jersey’s instruction:
There is no criminal intent if the defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that the
other person voluntarily consented to engage in [sexual intercourse] [sexual battery] [oral cop-
ulation] [sodomy] [or] [penetration of the [genital] [anal] opening by a foreign object, sub-
stance, instrument, or device]. Therefore, a reasonable and good faith belief that there was
voluntary consent is a defense to such a charge[.] [, unless the defendant thereafter became
aware or reasonably should have been aware that the other person no longer consented to the
sexual activity.]
This instruction is available only when evidence supports the mistake. See California v. Martinez, 224
P.3d 877, 908 (Cal. 2010). But see California v. Allen, No. B260165, 2016 WL 4482933, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 25, 2016) (rejecting mistake of fact defense as applied to statutory rape because of the public
policy considerations arising from statutory rape’s protection of youth).
79. See Utah v. Marchet, 284 P.3d 668, 674 (Utah App. 2012) (commenting that the judiciary may
craft a mistake of fact defense when an appropriate case arises: “[i]n the proper case, it may be wise to
consider the standards established by other jurisdictions, like California, when developing such a jury
instruction.”).
80. In Massachusetts v. Blache, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court created a mistake of fact
defense for offenses involving incapacity:
[I]f the complainant’s capacity to consent is again at issue, the defendant will be entitled to an
instruction that, in order to sustain a conviction on a theory of incapacity to consent, the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the
complainant’s condition rendered her incapable of consenting.
880 N.E.2d 736, 747 (Mass. 2008). That rule does not apply to the charges involving forcible rape
because lack of consent is immaterial to the element of force. Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 748 (“[b]ecause
G.L. c. 265, § 22, does not require proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent or
intent to engage in nonconsensual intercourse as a material element of the offense . . . [a]ny perception
(reasonable, honest, or otherwise) of the defendant as to the victim’s consent is . . . not relevant to a rape
prosecution.”) (quoting Massachusetts v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 966 (Mass. 2001)).
22
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3. Consent Secured by Fraud Is Deemed Valid Consent
Another important criticism of the operation of the non-consent actus
reus is that rape law, just like larceny before it evolved to include larceny-
by-trick, considers consent obtained by fraud or deceit as still valid con-
sent.81 California’s rape statute is notable for many reasons. California, like
all of the states, has formally abolished the marital rape exception, which
used to prevent a man from being prosecuted for rape if the victim was his
wife.82 However, like half of the states, California retains the concept that a
rapist’s marriage to the victim reduces the seriousness of the offense and
length of punishment.83 In California Penal Code § 261, the crime of rape is
defined as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the
spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances[.]”84
The enumerated circumstances include: incapacity due to a mental or physi-
cal condition, force, incapacity to resist arising from intoxication, and un-
consciousness because the victim
(A) [w]as unconscious or asleep; (B) [w]as not aware, knowing, perceiving,
or cognizant that the act occurred; (C) [w]as not aware, knowing, perceiving,
or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s
fraud in fact; [or] (D) [w]as not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of
the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraudulent rep-
resentation that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose when it
served no professional purpose.85
This unconscious prong has received attention arising from two public
cases. In the 1985 case of Boro v. Superior Court,86 Mr. Boro falsely told a
young woman that he was a doctor, that he had the results of her recent
blood test, and that she had a dangerous, infectious, and potentially fatal
disease. He claimed she had two days to treat the disease, by electing for
either a painful $9,000 surgery or a $1,000 procedure involving sex with a
donor who had been injected with a serum that could cure the disease. The
rape victim chose the latter option and engaged in sexual intercourse, and
the police apprehended Mr. Boro after being contacted by the woman’s em-
81. For an excellent discussion and criticism of this part of rape law, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle
of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013).
82. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. R
83. Although few states follow the Model Penal Code’s recommendation to codify the marital rape
exemption, they do follow the MPC’s recommendation to grade the seriousness of the offense based on
the marital status of the parties rather than the nature of harm inflicted. See Anderson, supra note 44, at R
1521. Approximately half of the states “prescrib[e] lower punishment for marital rape, or . . . permit[ ]
prosecution only when the husband has used the most serious forms of force.” SANFORD KADISH ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES CASES AND MATERIALS 407 (9th ed. 2012).
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a) (West 2013).
85. Id. § 261(a)(1)–(4).
86. 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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ployer who saw the scheme for what it was.87 The rapist was acquitted
under the old version of the law that only had the first three subsections
defining fraud. Because the victim consented to the rape, even though the
consent was induced by fraud, the rape was not actionable. As the court
explained, the rapist did not misrepresent that sexual intercourse would oc-
cur, he only misrepresented the reasons for it.88 Because the victim con-
sented to sexual intercourse, there was no fraud with respect to the essential
characteristics of how unwanted sex was defined as rape under the statute.
To prevent this circumstance in the future, the California Legislature added
subsection 4, which explicitly makes misrepresentations of professional
purpose a crime.89
Another recent case that illustrates the problem of how consent in-
duced by fraud is still deemed consent is California v. Morales,90 a 2013
case decided by the California Court of Appeal. In Morales, an 18-year-old
woman referred to as Jane went to a party with her boyfriend and other
friends. The defendant, Julio, was also attending the party. After three to
five beers, Jane left the party with her boyfriend and friends, and they re-
turned to her house where they had food before going to sleep. One of the
friends invited Julio to the house.91
Jane and her boyfriend retired to her bedroom where they talked about
having sex. When they realized they did not have a condom, they decided
not to have unprotected sex. Jane fell asleep next to her boyfriend. Some-
time later, the boyfriend left the bedroom to sleep at his house.92
Jane woke up to the “sensation of having sex . . . . She was confused
because she and [her boyfriend] had agreed not to have sex that night.”93
She nonetheless engaged in sex until a light through a crack in the bedroom
door revealed that the face of the person whom she had assumed to be her
boyfriend was in fact that of Julio. Jane immediately attempted to push him
away, cried, and yelled. Julio then left the room.94
In determining whether Julio was guilty of rape, the California Court
of Appeal noted that consent procured by deceit is only actionable under
subsection 5 of California Penal Code § 261.5 when “a person submits
under the belief that the person committing the act is the victim’s spouse,
and this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced
87. Id. at 1226–27.
88. Id. at 1228.
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4)(D); see Patricia Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64
BROOK. L. REV. 39, 111 (1998).
90. 212 Cal. App. 4th 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
91. Morales, 212 Cal. App. 4th at 587.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 587–88.
94. Id. at 588.
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by the accused, with intent to induce the belief.”95 Because the plain mean-
ing of the statute limited deceit to impersonating a person’s spouse, and
because the legislature undertook many reforms to the statute without dis-
turbing this limitation, the Court “reluctantly h[e]ld that a person who ac-
complishes sexual intercourse by impersonating someone other than a mar-
ried victim’s spouse is not guilty of the crime of rape.”96 The California
Legislature subsequently and quickly (within nine months) enacted legisla-
tion to change the phrase “victim’s spouse” to “someone known to the vic-
tim other than the accused.”97 Nonetheless, this case illustrates how the
actus reus of non-consent is underinclusive in defining unwanted sex as
criminal rape.
The 2006 case of Iowa v. Bolsinger98 is another example of how fraud
in fact immunizes unwanted sex from actionability. In Bolsinger, a program
supervisor for juvenile delinquents was convicted of third-degree sexual as-
sault, which in relevant part criminalizes a sex act if it occurs by “force or
against the will of the other person.”99 The jury was instructed that “against
the will of another” includes “deception concerning the nature of the act.”
In the facts of Bolsinger, the program supervisor would meet with boys in
private rooms, explain that he was checking for bruises and testicular can-
cer, and ask permission to touch the boys’ genitals. The boys testified that
the program supervisor did not appear to gain any sexual gratification from
touching the boys. They further testified that they gave permission at the
time of the touching, but if they had known the supervisor was not con-
ducting a genuine medical exam, they would have withheld consent.100
Again, due to the limited definition of consent in rape statutes, the
program supervisor’s conviction was overturned for not matching the ele-
ments of the crime of sexual assault.101 The boys did consent to the touch-
ing of their genitals, which as explained by the court was fraud in the in-
ducement and not fraud in fact (which would have occurred if the boys had
95. Id. at 595 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(5) (2012)) (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 595.
97. The new provision provides: “Where a person submits under the belief that the person commit-
ting the act is someone known to the victim other than the accused, and this belief is induced by any
artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce the belief.” CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261(a)(5); see also Crimes and Offenses—Sex Offenses—Expanded Definition, Assemb. 65,
2013 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 259 (Lexis Advance) (“Existing law provides
various circumstances that constitute sodomy against an individual’s will, including an act accomplished
with an individual who is not the spouse of the perpetrator . . . . This bill would instead provide that
these types of rape and sodomy occur where the person submits under the belief that the person commit-
ting the act is someone known to the victim other than the accused.”).
98. 709 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 2006).
99. Id. at 561–62 (quoting IOWA CODE § 709.4 (2006)).
100. Id. at 562.
101. Id. at 566.
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consented to being touched on the knee and the supervisor secretly touched
their genitals).102 A common limitation then of the actus reus of non-con-
sent is that the vast majority of states relying on such non-consent codify
that, in the context of rape, consent secured by fraud or deceit remains
valid.
IV. NEEDED REFORM TO OLD UNDERSTANDINGS OF RAPE
Unlike the crime of rape, as detailed above, the crimes of larceny and
homicide evolved into sophisticated and myriad offenses. In recognizing
computer crimes, larceny responded to the needs of defining criminal con-
duct from legal behavior in emerging technologies.103 In homicide law,
states responded to both changing technologies and social norms. In the
1930s, the new crime of vehicular homicide punished those whose negli-
gent driving of a car caused the death of another.104 Starting in the 1980s, in
response to the social opprobrium towards drunk drivers, prosecutors
charged and convicted what would have been vehicular homicide as sec-
ond-degree murder to punish the egregious callousness of the driver.105 It is
well past the time for rape law to evolve to comport with contemporary
norms over what separates wanted sex from unwanted sex.
102. Id. at 564.
103. Catherine Pelker et al., Computer Crimes, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 793, 795–96 (2015) (“While
the term ‘computer crime’ includes traditional crimes committed with the use of a computer, the rapid
emergence of computer technologies and the Internet’s exponential growth spawned a variety of new,
technology-specific criminal behaviors that must also be included in the ‘computer crimes’ category. To
combat these criminal behaviors, prosecutors rely on technology-specific legislation passed by Congress
as well as applications of conventional law to activities in cyberspace.”).
104. California v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 283–84 (Cal. 1981) (“When the Penal Code was enacted in
1872, manslaughter was defined in section 192 as an unlawful killing of a human being without malice,
and was characterized as being either voluntary or involuntary. A specific statute directed at vehicular
homicides was enacted in 1935 as Vehicle Code section 500 (Stats. 1935, ch. 764, p. 2141). That section
provided for imprisonment of one year in the county jail or three years in the state prison for deaths
which occurred within one year as the proximate result of injuries caused by the negligent driving of a
vehicle.”) (emphasis in original).
105. Washington v. Barstad, 970 P.2d 324, 328–29 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (In rejecting a defen-
dant’s challenge to being charged with second degree murder instead of vehicular homicide, the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals justified the higher charge because “the facts must evidence the defendant’s
subjective knowledge his act is extremely dangerous, and his indifference to the consequences.”) (citing
United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1984); Slaughter v. Alabama, 424 So. 2d 1365 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1982); Michigan v. Vasquez, 341 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); New Mexico v. IBN
Omar–Muhammad, 694 P.2d 922 (N.M. 1985); North Carolina v. Snyder, 317 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. 1984);
Tennessee v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1986); Wagner v. Wisconsin, 250 N.W.2d 331 (Wis.
1977)); Kenneth F. Lewis, Pennsylvania’s Limitations on Social Host Liability: Adding Insult to Injury?,
97 DICK. L. REV. 753, 753 (1993) (“National, state and local governments, as well as a variety of citizen
groups have been working to keep drunk drivers off the road. Congress recently passed the Omnibus
Drug Initiative Act of 1988 which gives states monetary incentives to implement programs designed to
ameliorate the drunk driving problem, and the states have individually initiated a variety of measures to
combat drunk driving.”).
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A. The Actus Reus of Affirmative Consent Does Not Capture the Actual
Social Harm of Acquaintance Rape
A response to outdated aspects of force and non-consent has been the
proposal to define the consent element in rape more broadly. Known as
affirmative consent laws, or colloquially “yes means yes” laws, California
was the first state to respond to sexual assault on college campuses by re-
quiring “affirmative, conscious and voluntary agreement to engage in sex-
ual activity.”106 Of note, this law is not part of the penal code in defining
degrees of sexual assault. Rather, included under California Educational
Code § 67386, the California Legislature conditions state funds for student
financial assistance on the enactment of a sexual assault policy on cam-
pus.107
This standard requires that campuses adopt an affirmative consent pol-
icy that requires participants in sexual activity to engage in continuous com-
munication regarding consent. California’s law provides:
‘Affirmative consent’ means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement
to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in
the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the
other or others to engage in the sexual activity. Lack of protest or resistance
does not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent. Affirmative consent
must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time.
The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or the
fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be assumed
to be an indicator of consent.108
The policy also requires that the colleges adjudicate the complaints
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, and it excludes a number
of defenses relating to the victim’s mental and physical state (including
intoxication) and the accused’s lack of knowledge arising from not under-
taking affirmative steps to secure consent.109 In 2015, California codified
this policy to apply to its public universities.110 California was not alone.
By 2015, often without the action of state legislatures, “[a]n estimated
1,400 institutions of higher education ha[d] adopted disciplinary standards
that codify an affirmative definition of sexual consent.”111
106. Kevin de Leo´n & Hannah-Beth Jackson, Why We Made ‘Yes Means Yes’ California Law,
WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/3Q26-TE2E.
107. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a) (West 2016).
108. Id. § 67386(a)(1).
109. Id. § 67386(a)(2)–(3).
110. Id. § 67386.
111. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 442 n.1 (2016) (citing
Sandy Keenan, Affirmative Consent: Are Students Really Asking?, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2015), https://
perma.cc/9JDH-KTVS (citing 2015 estimate of National Center for Higher Education Risk Manage-
ment)).
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There is no doubt that the affirmative consent standard is an attempt to
reform the myriad problems that have prevented fair, proper, and actual
adjudication of rape in the courts and through college disciplinary proceed-
ings. However, critics have leveled some fair and growing critiques over
this policy. Some have commented on the due process problems that arise
in lowering the burden from reasonable doubt to a preponderance of evi-
dence.112 I join those who have noted that as much as it is true that anyone
following this law cannot be found guilty of rape or having unwanted sex,
this definition fails because it is overinclusive.113 It is hard to imagine that
individuals in relationships free from abuse and violence regularly comport
with this law and utilize the level of prescribed communication when en-
gaging in what both partners consider consensual sex. Returning to the ear-
lier visual chart, affirmative consent laws sweep in too much wanted sex as
actionable rape.
Illustration 3: Affirmative Consent Laws
Lawful
sex
Unlawful
rape
A central problem with affirmative consent laws is that the offense is
simply a failure to communicate in the manner prescribed by statute. Such a
detailed, affirmative, and continuing level of communication is not fol-
lowed by numerous individuals who nonetheless consider their activity con-
sensual. Affirmative consent laws then do not effectively capture the es-
sence of what makes some sex unwanted and other sex wanted. Stated an-
other way, as much as affirmative consent laws can set forth what one type
of wanted sex looks like, they cannot capture what is the precise harm in
unwanted sex. In this respect, this law lacks the defining feature of captur-
ing the social wrong in acquaintance rape as much as the force and non-
consent statutes did.
112. See Alan Dershowitz, Innocent Until Proven Guilty? Not Under ‘Yes Means Yes’, WASH. POST
(Oct. 14, 2015), https://perma.cc/DNT4-HD72; Aya Gruber, Rape Law Revisited, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 279, 288–89 (2016) (“The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, accordingly, produces dispropor-
tionately frequent findings of guilt (in relation to other types of disciplinary allegations) when decision-
makers are predisposed toward finding rape occurred, just as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
arguably permitted disproportionate acquittals, when criminal jurors were predisposed toward disbeliev-
ing or disliking rape complainants.”).
113. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 112, at 289–90 (“Is proceeding with sex without a ‘yes’ retribu- R
tively wrongful?”).
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B. Developing the Crime of Rape by Malice
As set forth above, much attention has been paid to finding an actus
reus that captures the crime of rape. This has been the focus of legislative
reforms over the past forty years. Such reforms abolished the resistance
element and marital rape exemption, while crafting non-consent, and more
recently affirmative consent, as a replacement or supplement to rape by
forcible compulsion. Less legislative attention has been paid to grading rape
on the basis of mens rea. Statutory rape (sex between an adult and a minor)
is an exception simply because it persists as a rare status crime not requiring
a mens rea in a majority of—but not all—states.114
For rape between adults, however, the legislatures have not undertaken
the same desire to grade rape by the mens rea found in other crimes.115
Over a decade ago, Professor Robin Charlow started an important conversa-
tion, asking whether the concepts of willful blindness, callous indifference,
and moral indifference could be imported into defining unwanted sex as
crimes.116 Although she rejected these concepts out of concern of their
practical implementations,117 I wish to revive the question of whether rape
114. DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 356 (3d
ed. 2013) (“A majority of states make statutory rape (typically a person under seventeen years of age) a
strict liability offense with respect to the child’s age. This principle results in some prosecutions in
which the intercourse is undisputedly consensual and the child is nearly the age of consent, with the
defendant reasonably believing her to be of lawful age.”).
For a number of states, however, marriage is a defense to statutory crime. Maura Strassberg, The
Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 378 n.177 (2003) (“It is generally under-
stood, in Utah and elsewhere, that sexual relations in the context of a valid marriage to a minor is a
defense to what otherwise would be statutory rape.”); Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693–94
(9th Cir. 2007) (California’s crime of statutory rape is not a crime of moral turpitude in part “because
some conduct criminalized under § 261.5(d) would be legal if the adult and minor were married.” This
exception arises because the social ill is not sex between adults and minors but stopping births of chil-
dren to unwed mothers. “California’s purpose in passing the law reveals that it was not moral, so much
as pragmatic-they were attempting to reduce teenage pregnancies.”); Quintero-Salazar, 506 F.3d at 693
(citing Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981)) (“[T]he justification
for the statute offered by the State, and accepted by the Supreme Court of California, is that the legisla-
ture sought to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies.”).
115. See Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 263, 267–68 (2002) (“The mens rea of rape usually refers instead to the defendant’s mental atti-
tude toward the element of nonconsent. Thus, what one cares about is whether the defendant, who had
intercourse without consent, wanted to have sex without consent, knew he did not have consent, or was
reckless or negligent as to whether he had the complainant’s consent. When I refer to the mens rea of
rape, I mean to refer to whichever of these is required to prove a charge of rape.”); see Kinports, supra
note 10, at 759 (“Very little attention has been paid to the mens rea applicable to the element of force, R
that is, the defendant’s state of mind with respect to the presence of force.”).
116. Charlow, supra note 115, at 315 (“One promising prospect to resolve the issue of noncriminal R
bad acts is to formulate an entirely new mens rea that identifies what is going on in the minds of the
individuals whose mental states do not conform to traditional knowledge or willful blindness require-
ments. In recent years, several writers have named various forms of “indifference,” that appear to en-
compass the relevant state of mind, as sufficiently culpable mental states to warrant criminal sanction.”).
117. Id. at 298.
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can benefit from the lessons of other crimes. I think the most compelling
reason to revive that discussion is that the limitations of the element of non-
consent arise in large part from having a knowledge mens rea or consent
mens rea that permits certain unwanted sex to remain non-actionable.
1. The Mens Rea of Malice
The concept of malice is an important one to define. Arising in homi-
cide, malice is a term of art that arises not simply from ill will or the charac-
ter of the actor.118 Malice is usually described as acting with an abandoned
and malignant heart, which captures a wanton indifference—whether it
arises from recklessness or callousness or anti-social motives—towards the
risk of harming or killing another.119 Malice has a subjective component
which “requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endan-
gers the life of another—no more, and no less.”120 Malice also has an objec-
tive component of risk of harm. “If a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s
position would have been aware of the risk involved, then [the] defendant is
presumed to have had such an awareness.”121
As an example, in Washington State a person is guilty of first-degree
murder when “[u]nder circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference
to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person.”122 To find
someone guilty, a jury is directed to find the elements: (1) that the defen-
dant “created a grave risk of death to another person”; (2) that subjectively
“the defendant knew of and disregarded the grave risk of death”; and (3)
that objectively “the defendant engaged in that conduct under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.”123
The most common illustration of malice is a person shooting a gun
into a crowd. The shooter may have had no intent to kill any specific per-
son, but the term malice captures and punishes the harm arising from gross
indifference towards whether the bullets would in fact harm another. But
118. California v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 363–64 (Cal. 1966), overruled on other grounds by Cali-
fornia v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1998) (“The charge in the terms of the ‘abandoned and malignant
heart’ could lead the jury to equate the malignant heart with an evil disposition or a despicable character;
the jury, then, in a close case, may convict because it believes the defendant a ‘bad man.’ We should not
turn the focus of the jury’s task from close analysis of the facts to loose evaluation of defendant’s
character.”).
119. California v. Knoller, 158 P.3d 731, 738 (Cal. 2007) (Recognizing that malice is defined as “a
base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life . . . .”(quoting People v. Thomas, 261
P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1953)).
120. Knoller, 158 P.3d at 733.
121. California v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 283 (Cal. 1981) (citing Weber v. Pinyan, 70 P.2d 183 (Cal.
1937)).
122. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(b) (West 2016).
123. WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. 26.06 (4th ed. 2016).
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malice is often used in other contexts where the actor exhibits a high disre-
gard over whether his or her conduct presents a risk of harm to another.
For instance, in Washington State, a man named James Barstad drove
a car that hit and killed two women.124 Prior to their deaths, Mr. Barstad
had consumed a large quantity of alcohol and gotten into a fight with his
girlfriend. A little after 7:00 p.m., Mr. Barstad’s girlfriend asked him to
leave her house. He complied with her request, intending to drive his truck
to a park to sleep off the alcohol. Mr. Barstad was agitated and emotionally
angry. At one point, a couple saw Mr. Barstad pacing in the road, and when
they slowly drove past him, he charged at them and gestured as if he were
shooting at them. Shortly after, Mr. Barstad got back in his truck and drove
forty to fifty miles per hour towards another driver. Mr. Barstad applied his
brakes, creating blue smoke. He grinned at the driver he nearly hit, jumped
a curb, and drove on a lawn around a building. Following this, Mr. Barstad
ran a red light, driving forty-five to fifty miles an hour, flipping off motor-
ists as he drove past. Mr. Barstad then accelerated into a second intersec-
tion, running a red light at a speed of fifty-five to sixty miles an hour. Mr.
Barstad testified that he knew he was going too fast to stop and accelerated
to get through the intersection before the cross traffic started. This time, Mr.
Barstad’s truck hit two cars, killing a passenger and driver. After the colli-
sion, he had a 0.16 blood alcohol level, was angry, and failed to show re-
morse.125
The prosecutor charged Mr. Barstad with two counts of first-degree
murder based on his reckless indifference towards life.126 He objected to the
charge and instructions, but the Court of Appeals was satisfied that the ob-
jective component met the “extreme indifference” prong because of the
“level of intoxication, his excessive speed, the fact he had run a red light
and confronted other motorists even before he reached the Hamilton/Mis-
sion intersection, and his expressed contempt for the injuries he caused,
[gave] meaning to the term ‘extreme indifference’ in this case.”127 Mr. Bar-
stad contended that he lacked the subjective intent to kill. The court dis-
agreed that an intent to kill was required: “It is not required that the of-
fender intended to commit the offense. He need only know of and disregard
the fact his conduct presents a grave risk of death to others, as evidenced by
circumstances that manifest his extreme indifference to human life.”128
124. Washington v. Barstad, 970 P.2d 324, 326 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
125. Id. at 326–27.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 325.
128. Id. at 329.
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The Barstad case, then, is a template to explain how facts evincing an
extreme indifference to human life ratchet up a drunk driving offense to
murder by malice.
2. Defining the Elements of Rape by Malice
This article proposes using malice to define the crime of rape. In Mon-
tana, the crime of sexual intercourse without consent is defined as “[a] per-
son who knowingly has sexual intercourse without consent with another
person.”129 The jury is directed to find three elements: (1) that the defen-
dant “had sexual intercourse” with the victim; (2) that the sexual intercourse
was without the consent of the victim; and (3) “[t]he defendant acted know-
ingly.”130 “Knowingly” is defined to occur when either a person “is aware
of his or her conduct,” “is aware there exists a high probability that [his or
her] conduct will cause a specific result,” or “is aware of a high probability
of that fact’s existence.”131
Returning to Krakauer’s Missoula, the Jordan Johnson case helps illus-
trate the value of this proposed reform. In that case, Johnson and the victim,
referred to as Cecilia Washburn, were both students at the University of
Montana. Johnson was the star quarterback. On one fateful Saturday, they
texted in the afternoon and planned to meet up that evening to watch a
movie at Washburn’s house.132 After drinking for five hours, Johnson sent
Washburn a text asking her to pick him up because he had been drinking,
and when they returned to her house, they started watching a movie.133
They began kissing, and Jordan grabbed her arm and started “getting really
excited.” Washburn said she told him to take a break and watch the movie.
Johnson rolled back on top of her and “[s]eemed determined to have inter-
course.” He pinned her down, took off her clothes, grabbed her hips, turned
her over, and told her, “You said you wanted it,” and then penetrated her
vagina with his penis.134 As soon as he was finished, he put on his clothes,
and she texted her roommate in the next room, reporting, “I think I might
have just gotten raped. He kept pushing and pushing and I said no but he
wouldn’t listen. . . omg what do I do!”135 Shocked, the roommate waited a
few minutes and then replied for her to get out of the room, which she did
129. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–503 (2015).
130. MONT. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5–125(a) (2009).
131. Id. 2–104.
132. KRAKAUER, supra note 3, at 135. R
133. Id. at 135–36.
134. Id. at 137–38.
135. Id. at 260, 281.
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minutes later. Washburn looked like she was about to cry, drove Johnson
home, and then returned upset.136
Johnson also testified and provided a different account of the sexual
encounter. Johnson described that he took off Washburn’s clothes; that he
touched her genitals; and that, once naked, Washburn asked if he had a
condom and when he said he did not, she answered “It’s okay.”137 He testi-
fied that they had sex in the missionary position and she switched to her
stomach before continuing intercourse. He testified that she was moaning
and had no outward signs of resistance or non-consent.138 He ejaculated in
his hand, he cleaned off his hand, and they both put on their clothes. He
testified that Washburn did not have an orgasm, that they did not kiss or
cuddle afterwards, and that Washburn drove him home.139
The jury acquitted Johnson.140 In a post-trial interview with Krakauer,
one juror explained that the jurors found Ms. Washburn truthful and her
account of the rape credible.141 Indeed, at the first vote, three or four jurors
initially voted for a guilty verdict.142 The juror nonetheless defended the
final unanimous acquittal because the verdict was “based wholly on the
letter of the law as instructed by the judge” and that there was not convinc-
ing evidence that Mr. Johnson “was aware . . . the sex was non-consen-
sual.”143
The juror’s comment is correct. Under the facts given, there was not
sufficient evidence that Johnson knew that he was having sex without
Washburn’s consent because knowledge is defined as his “awareness” or
“high probability” that the sex was not consensual.144 According to his tes-
timony, there was no awareness of non-consent.145 Looking just at Wash-
burn’s testimony, it establishes that the sex occurred without her consent,
but there is insufficient evidence that Johnson was aware that that was the
case.146
136. Id. at 138–39.
137. Id. at 278–79.
138. Id. at 280–81.
139. Id. at 281–82.
140. Id. at 299.
141. Id. at 302 (“The juror found Ms. Washburn completely credible. She seemed invested in her
studies and focused on her career.  I did not believe she manufactured her story of vengeance or malice
of any kind. She seemed far too intelligent to have attempted to profit by false claims. . . .”).
142. Id. at 303.
143. Id.
144. See MONT. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 2–104.
145. KRAKAUER, supra note 3, at 276–88 (Johnson’s recitation of the encounter did not contain R
admissions of having sex without Washburn’s consent).
146. Id. at 135–39 (Krakauer’s narrative of the rape, which included Washburn’s testimony, de-
scribes the sex as having occurred without her consent, but there was no testimony that Johnson ever
admitted to her or to anyone else that the sex was without consent).
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The Jordan Johnson case is significant in establishing that some ac-
quittals in rape charges do not arise because the jury believes the defen-
dant’s side and disbelieves the victim’s testimony. To the contrary, a barrier
to conviction arises from the high standard of awareness that a defendant
must have to be found guilty of rape. It is no longer a question of credibil-
ity. It is an evidentiary problem in establishing that a defendant was aware
that the sex is unwanted—even when a jury found it to have been un-
wanted.
This is where changing the mens rea from knowledge to malice could
be significant. Instead of instructing a jury that there must be evidence that
Johnson knew the sex was not consensual, the jury could have been in-
structed to find the elements that (1) the defendant created a grave risk of
having sex without consent (objective); (2) the defendant knew of and dis-
regarded the grave risk of having sex without consent (subjective); and (3)
the defendant engaged in that conduct under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to whether the sex was without consent.
Just like homicide cases, the specific facts of any given circumstance
are relevant in assessing whether the objective risk was present to a reason-
able person. Applied to the facts of the Jordan Johnson case, the following
facts from Washburn’s and Johnson’s testimony—deemed credible—would
be legally relevant to the first element: showing up to a date intoxicated,
never having had sex with this partner before, not using a condom,147 pro-
ceeding to sex after being told to watch a movie instead of kissing, not
discussing and asking about current desires, not kissing or cuddling after
sex, and not providing the partner with sexual gratification. These facts
could have been evidence establishing a grave risk of having sex without
consent.
Turning to the second element, the jury may have inferred that John-
son knew and disregarded the risk of having sex without consent by acts
and omissions such as ignoring signals of non-consent, failing to secure
actual consent, and after ejaculation, not speaking or acting in ways consis-
tent with consensual intimate interactions.
Under rape by malice, the evidence from Johnson’s trial presents a
different inquiry for the jury than just the question of whether he had
knowledge that his actions were without consent. I would contend that more
jurors would agree that the evidence adds up to an objective risk of non-
147. Some states have clarified by statute that even when sex occurs with protection, that fact cannot
disprove a victim’s claim that the sex was without consent. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.7 (“In
prosecutions under Section 261, 262, 286, 288a, or 289, in which consent is at issue, evidence that the
victim suggested, requested, or otherwise communicated to the defendant that the defendant use a con-
dom or other birth control device, without additional evidence of consent, is not sufficient to constitute
consent.”).
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consent and a subjective disregard of that risk even if the evidence does not
establish knowledge of consent.
The malice standard will not render all instances of unwanted sex as
criminal, but it will increase the conduct it criminalizes from the current
knowledge standard. Given that the current definitions of rape result in a
3% conviction rate,148 even a modest capture of more unwanted sex as ac-
tionable rape will increase convictions.
Illustration 4: Existing Convictions Versus Rape by Malice
Existing Definition:
Lawful
sex
Unlawful
rape
Rape by Malice?
Lawful
sex
Unlawful
rape
Furthermore, rape by malice achieves what affirmative consent at-
tempts to do—it renders actionable behaviors of those who have sex with-
out the consent of his or her partner. But unlike the overinclusive nature of
affirmative consent, a jury must assess the specific facts and circumstances
of any given encounter to evaluate an objective assessment of risk. Unlike
affirmative consent, malice then will not be overinclusive in capturing
wanted sex as a criminal offense.
3. Potential Criticism of Rape by Malice
A primary criticism with using the term malice, most notably from
those who prefer the MPC, is that the term is imprecise. In the homicide
context, drafters of the MPC rejected the term and notion of malice “be-
cause they saw this phrase as a sentimental, ambiguous, holdover of an
ancient common law.”149 In criminal law, the need for precision is even
more present than other areas of the law because due process demands that
148. See 97 of Every 100 Rapists Receive No Punishment, supra note 2. R
149. V.F. Nourse, Hearts and Minds: Understanding the New Culpability, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
361, 371 (2002).
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a defendant have an opportunity to follow the law, which a vague or ambig-
uously defined crime prevents.
A likely secondary criticism is that malice is simply attempting to re-
place knowledge with a recklessness or negligence mens rea. I share the
viewpoint that civil negligence has no place in criminal law because penal
sanctions, as a normative matter, should not apply to “misfortune or acci-
dent.”150 For clarification, malice is not simply a more confusing way to
define recklessness.
Professor V. F. Nourse wrote a lengthy and powerful article defending
use of the term malice at common law and in contemporary criminal law.151
In responding to the criticism that the term malice is vague and sentimental,
he asserted that the term was grounded in reason, or the lack of reason that
arises from the anti-social behavior in having contempt towards others. “A
man was also depraved or of ‘bad heart’ who could not recognize the appro-
priate limits of his relations to others or who simply acted for no reason at
all.”152
The very breadth of the term malice then is its greatest strength.
Whereas the MPC’s alternative term “recklessness” is simply a gauge of
risk,153 malice captures both reckless conduct and an actor’s contempt ani-
mating his conduct.
In the context of campus rape, it is precisely a person’s contempt—not
simply reckless behavior—for another that is often the cause for unwanted
sex. For years, scholars have argued against using the term “date rape” be-
cause it minimizes sexual assault, suggesting that the attack was a mere
“unfortunate encounter in which the two parties share culpability because of
150. California, like other states, has codified the principle that civil negligence is not actionable in
criminal law; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (2008) (No crime occurs if the act or omission arises “through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there [is] no evil design, intention, or culpable negli-
gence.”).
151. See generally Nourse, supra note 149. R
152. Id. at 376–77.
153. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 120 (1996) (“The Model
Penal Code’s (‘MPC’) definition of reckless murder provides a good example of the view that full
awareness of risk is critical to criminal responsibility. The MPC divides the mens rea for reckless mur-
der into four parts: that the offender have (1) consciously disregarded, (2) a substantial, and (3) unjustifi-
able risk to human life, (4) under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life. These components are referred to as the awareness, danger, necessity and indifference elements.
The danger and necessity elements require proof that the defendant’s conduct created a significant risk
to human life for no good reason. The risk must be so substantial and unnecessary that ‘its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor’s situation.’ The standard permits risk-taking where an overriding concern justifies it. Surgeons
and police officers may knowingly risk others’ lives if they have an overriding medical or legal reason
for their conduct.”).
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too much alcohol and too little clear communication.”154 The term and its
resulting mythology obscures the reality that assailants of sexual assault
that fall in the category of “date rape” are much more predatory than the
term suggests. In research with assailants who were convicted of only one
sexual offense but were granted immunity to discuss their prior conduct, the
assailants admitted to multiple attacks—ranging from seven to eleven—
against women for which they were never prosecuted.155 As argued by Di-
ane Rosenfeld, a more apt term for date rape or acquaintance rape then is
“target rape.”156 To the extent that acquaintances are formed, they are
formed out of predatory impulses to groom the victim to be less wary of the
attack.157
In this respect, rape by malice serves this article’s call to have the
crime’s definition effectively separate legal behavior from criminal con-
duct. Sexual conduct with contempt or indifference towards whether the
partner is providing consent captures a very meaningful harm in unwanted
sex. It is not the result of force; it is not the omission of consent. Rather, it
is the assailant’s mindset and assumption that he is entitled to engage in
intimacy with another without care or concern for whether the intimacy is
being freely given. Recklessness does not capture that harm, but malice—
one “who could not recognize the appropriate limits of his relations to
others or who simply acted for no reason at all” does.158
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that if rape law were to be written today, its essence would
neither be force nor simply power imbalance. The sexist origins of rape no
doubt stunted its evolution into multiple and sophisticated offenses that
crimes such as homicide and theft undertook. But the good news is that
there is absolutely no reason to be beholden to the past. Unlike the exten-
sive and lengthy court battles citizens engaged in to claim constitutional
equality in schools, workplaces, and marriage, criminal statutes are within
154. Lisak, supra note 4, at 50 (Dr. Lisak continues to argue that this mythology leads to jurors to be R
inclined to apportion blame rather than find an assailant culpable).
155. Id. at 55 (citing studies); see also Karen Herzog, Graphic Details Emerge in University of
Wisconsin-Madison Rape Case, USA TODAY, (Oct. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/BUG7-HBEH (reporting
that a college student arrested for acquaintance rape had in his possession a notebook documenting his
“stalking and grooming” techniques and at least five women have come forward alleging that he had
sexually assaulted them).
156. Diane Rosenfeld, Harvard Law School Lecturer on Law, Mont. L. Rev. Browning Symposium:
Sexual Assault on Campus; Conflicts Between Campus and Courts (2016).
157. See Rosenfeld, supra note 156; see also Herzog, supra note 155 (reporting that a college stu- R
dent arrested for acquaintance rape had in his possession a notebook documenting his “stalking and
grooming” techniques and at least five women have come forward alleging that he had sexually as-
saulted them).
158. See Nourse, supra note 149, at 376. R
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the province of the legislature. Modified and new crimes are created every
day with a simple majority vote and signature of the governor.
Why not then write the crime of rape to capture the nature of unwanted
sex and to precisely define unwanted sex to exclude wanted sexual activity?
Rape by malice is a suggested means to do just that. Altering the mens rea
from knowledge to callous disregard for the risk that one’s actions are with-
out the consent of another will sweep in more unwanted sex than what
current definitions of the offense do. But unlike affirmative consent laws, it
will not sweep in lawful sex that occurs without the specific form and
method of communication prescribed by statute.
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